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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)G) (2012). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issues 1 & 2 
Issue 1: Did the trial court properly award noneconomic damages for 
breach of contract where the jury found that such damages were a foreseeable 
consequence of Gregory & Swapp, PLLC dba Craig Swapp & Associates' (the 
Swapp Firm's) breach and undisputed evidence shows that such damages were 
explicitly contemplated by the Swapp Firm when contracting? 
Issue 2: Did the trial court properly award noneconomic damages for 
breach of fiduciary duty where the Swapp Firm and Erik_ Highberg (Defendants) 
willfully breached their duty of loyalty and there is evidence that their breaches 
@ left Ms. Kranendonk "devastated" and caused her "years of stress and worry"? 
Standard of Review: Issues 1 and 2 arise from Defendants' JNOV motion. 
This Court "review[s] rulings on JNOV motions for correctness." ASC Utah, Inc. 
v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2013 UT 24, 1 18, 309 P.3d 201. "To successfully 
attack a district court's refusal to grant a motion for JNOV based on insufficient 
evidence, "'an appellant must marshal all the evidence supporting the verdict 
and then demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to that verdict, the evidence is not sufficient to support it.""' Hess v. Canberra Dev. 
1 
Co., 2011 UT 22, ,r 28, 254 P.3d 161 (citations omitted). This Court "will not 
overturn a verdict on a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence ' [ s] o long as 
some evidence and reasonable inferences support the jury's findings.'" Brewer v. 
Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 2001 UT 77, ,r 36, 31 P.3d 557 (citation omitted). 
Preservation: Issues 1 and 2 were preserved through Defendants' JNOV 
motion. (R. 6744-66, 7057-70, 7083-7451, 7507-38, 7577-82.) 
Issues 3 & 4 
Issue 3: Did the trial court properly award Ms. Kranendonk attorney fees 
and properly base them on her contingency fee agreement where Defendants 
breached their fiduciary duties and the contingency fee was reasonable? 
Standard of Review: 
Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of 
law .... Likewise, whether the trial court's findings of fact in 
support of an award of fees are sufficient is a question of law .... 
However, the trial court has "broad discretion in determining what 
constitutes a reasonable fee .... " 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998) (internal citations omitte~). A 
decision regarding the standard used to determine a reasonable fee is reviewed 
de nova. USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2016 UT 20, ,r 31, 372 P.3d 629. 
Issue 4: Did the trial court err by failing to award Ms. Kranendonk her 
litigation expenses where Defendants breached their fiduciary duties and their 
litigation conduct is largely responsible for her expenses? 
2 
Standard of Review: Whether litigation expenses are recoverable is a 
question of law and is reviewed de nova. See Campbell v. State Fann Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, 1 127, 65 P.3d 1134, rev' d 011 other grounds, 538 U.S. 408 
\0b (2003). 
Preservation: Issues 3 and 4 were preserved through Ms. Kranendonk' s 
motion for fees and expenses. (R. 6701-16, 6788-6814, 6953-7040, 7584-7601, 7611-
7631, 7644-77, 7681-85, 7696-7709.) 
Issue 5 
Issue 5: Did the trial court abuse its discretion by excluding under rule 403 
Highberg's statements calling Ms. Kranendonk a "pain [in] the ass" and "a 
moron" where she had the burden of proving a knowing and reckless 
indifference toward, and a disregard of, her rights and Highberg' s trial testimony 
~ implied that he acted solely out of a solicitude that he felt for her personally. 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's decision to exclude 
evidence under rule 403 for abuse of discretion. Diversified Holdings, LCv. Turner, 
-" 
2002 UT 129, 1 6, 63 P.3d 686. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved through Defendants' motion in 
limine and Ms. Kranendonk's re-raising of the issue during trial. (R. 1851-58, 
2239-74, 2382-87, 8219-24, 8228-32, 5386-95, 8776-88.) 
3 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
There are no determinative provisions associated with issues 1 through 4. 
Issue 5 requires application of rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the full text 
of which is reproduced in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In 2006, Ms. Kranendonk was injured when two semi trucks smashed into 
her car while she was stopped in rush hour traffic outside Portland, Oregon. 1 She 
hired the Swapp Firm to file an injury claim in Oregon against the truckers, but 
the firm and its employee Highberg missed the statute of limitations. 2 
After Defendants lost her case, Ms. Kranendonk hired her current counsel, 
who also filed an action against the truckers in Oregon in an attempt to save her 
injury claim under Oregon's savings statute.3 The truckers admitted liability but 
prevailed on statute of limitations grounds.4 
Ms. Kranendonk then filed this iawsuit, alleging breach of contract; breach 
of fiduciary duty; negligence; and negligent hiring, training, and supervision.5 
1 R. 6573, 8964-68. 
2 R. 8899-8902, 8963, 8655-59. 
3 R. 1-17, 3302. 
4 R. 3302, 3307-09. 
5 R. 1-17, 928-46, 1029-32. 
4 
She also claimed punitive damages.6 The trial court found as a matter of law that 
Defendants were negligent and that the Swapp Firm breached its contract.7 The 
jury found that Defendants breached their fiduciary duties and that the Swapp 
~ Firm was liable for negligent hiring, training, and supervision.8 
As damages, the jury found Ms. Kranendonk' s underlying injury claim to 
be worth $750,000 and that Defendants' malpractice caused an additional 
$2,750,000 in noneconomic damages.9 
Ms. Kranendonk moved for attorney fees and litigation expenses. Io The 
court denied her request for expenses but granted her request for fees and based 
them on her contingency fee agreement, which it found to be reasonable. I I 
Defendants moved for JNOV, arguing that the trial court erred by 
awarding noneconomic damages, by awarding fees, and by basing the fee award 
I.:@ on Ms. Kranendonk' s contingency fee agreement. I2 That motion was denied. 13 
The parties have now filed cross appeals. I4 
6 R. 945. 
7 R. 6574. 
8 R. 6573-74. 
9 Id. 
10 R. 6701-16. 
11 R. 7696-7709. 
12 R. 6744-66, 7057-70. 
l3 R. 7576-83. 
5 
Statement of Facts1s 
Assembly Line & Peace of Mind 
The Swapp Firm is a high-volume personal injury firm; Highberg 
described their work as an "assembly line" for injury cases.16 At the same time, 
the Swapp Firm's "goal" is to provide peace of mind: its website says the firm 
14 R. 7710-12, 7830-32. After the parties appealed, this Court issued USA Power, 
LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2016 UT 20,372 P.3d 629. The trial court then issued a Minute 
Entry wherein it concluded that USA Power newly requires all attorney fee 
awards to be supported by a lodestar analysis unless they are being awarded as 
consequential damages for breach of an insurance contract. (R. 7752-55.) Because 
Ms. Kranendonk had not submitted lodestar evidence, the trial court said it was 
amending its prior order to decline her fee request. (Id.) 
Ms. Kranendonk responded with a Motion for Relief from Order or, in the 
Alternative, to Alter Judgment and Amend the Findings. (R. 7756-71.) She argued 
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to amend its attorney fee order since the 
case was on appeal. (R. 7756-62.) Alternatively, she argued that the trial court 
should alter its amended judgment because USA Power does not require a 
lodestar analysis in a case like this. (R. 7762-66.) Finally, she argued that if USA 
Power does newly require a lodestar analysis in a case like this, the trial court 
should allow her to submit lodestar evidence in response to that new law, and 
she submitted lodestar evidence showing that the court's initial fee award was 
reasonable. (R. 7766-71, 7779-7821.) Defendants agreed that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to issue the Minute Entry. (R. 7839-41.) The trial court then also 
agreed and declared its Minute Entry void. (R. 7861-63.) 
15 Among other things, Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. 
When ruling on such a challenge, this Court "review[s] all the evidence ... in the 
light most favorable to the verdicf' and II draw[s] '[a]ll reasonable inferences ... 
in favor of the verdict."' Hess, 2011 UT 22, ,I 28 (citation omitted). Accordingly, 
this Statement of Facts relies on evidence and reasonable inferences that support 
the verdict. 
16 R. 8591, 9063-64. 
6 
"eliminates the stress and uncertainty of dealing with your accident."17 In this 
vein, Craig Swapp testified: 
Q. . .. Now you recognize that the court process can be very 
stressful for clients? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The longer the case goes the more stressful it can get? 
A. Stressful for everyone involved. 
Q. Well especially for the clients, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And one of your jobs is to minimize that stress, to take care of 
the problems, to take care of the difficulties in the case, to 
manage the case and get everything done so the client doesn't 
have to stress about that, true? 
A. And that's what we tried to do in this case.18 
The Spokane Office 
In 2005, the Swapp Firm opened an office in Spokane, Washington, after a 
market survey showed that to be a good location for a television ad campaign for 
l@ personal injury clients.19 It hired Highberg as the sole lawyer in that office, which 
quickly acquired the largest caseload of any personal injury firm in the area.20 
17 R. 9081. 
18 R. 9438. 
l9 R. 9027-28. 
20 R. 8593, 8854-55. 
7 
Highberg was licensed in Oregon and Washington but had very little 
injury litigation experience.21 He had never tried a personal injury case, and the 
firm knew he lacked experience handling "large cases."22 Nevertheless, it put 
him over its Spokane office and all cases in that office.23 
In 2007, the Swapp Firm spent about $456,000 <ill advertising in the 
Spokane market alone.24 In 2008, its marketing expenses in that market totaled 
$472,000.25 Highberg' s caseload increased dramatically.26 
Management's initial target caseload for Highberg was under 50 cases.27 
Management knew his capacity was 50 to 60 files and that if it went into the 
seventies he would be overwhelmed.28 When his caseload reached the sixties, he 
told management that he needed help.29 However, the firm did not hire another 
attorney to help.30 By late 2007 and into 2008, Highberg was working seven days 
21 R. 8580-81, 8585-88. 
22 R. 9062-63. 
23 R. 9063. 
24 Trial Ex. 32. 
2s Id. 
26 R. 8855-59, 8865-66. 
27 R. 8856-57. 
28 R. 8857. 
29 R. 8857, 8861, 9077. 
30 R. 8607, 8861-62, 9071-72, 9079. 
8 
a week, eighty hours every week, trying to keep up.31 He knew the risk was high 
that he would begin to miss deadlines, and by spring 2008 his paralegals did 
begin to miss deadlines. 32 
By mid-2008, Highberg was responsible for 108 active litigation files, while 
typical caseloads for other Swapp Firm attorneys were in the mid-forties to 
fifties.33 Highberg warned management that he was overwhelmed.34 The firm 
had Utah attorneys that could have assisted Highberg, and it could have referred 
his cases to other Washington attorneys, but it did neither of those things.35 
Craig Swapp did not want to hire another attorney for the Spokane office 
because he worried that that would not be cost effective.36 It took the firm's 
litigation manager nearly a year to convince Craig Swapp to hire another 
attorney for the Spokane office.37 
31 R. 8604-05. 
32 R. 8602-03. 
33 R. 8596, 8604, 8850-51. 
34 R. 8857, 8860-61. 
35 R. 8607, 8861-62, 8866, 9071-72, 9076, 9079. 
~ 36 R. 8862-63. 
37 R. 8863. 
9 
Ms. Kranendonk' s Case 
Ms. Kranendonk is from Utah.38 In 2006, she was injured when two semi 
trucks smashed into her car in Oregon.39 Her husband called the Swapp Firm, 
which met with Ms. Kranendonk when she returned to Utah.40 In February 2007, 
when Highberg' s caseload was becoming a concern, and although he had never 
fully litigated an Oregon injury claim or handled a truck crash case, the Swapp 
Firm transferred Ms. Kranendonk' s case to its Spokane office. 41 
Oregon Proceedings 
Highberg filed a complaint in Oregon, asserting that Ms. Kranendonk had 
"suffered injuries to her neck, back, and knees, resulting in multiple surgeries on 
her left knee."42 Thereafter, he said she had "sustained massive injuries."43 
In Oregon, a complaint must be served within sixty days of filing. 44 
Highberg failed to serve the truckers within sixty days, and the complaint was 
dismissed, but no one told Ms. Kranendonk.45 
38 R. 8961-62. 
39 R. 8964, 9172-9244. 
40 R. 8899-8901, 8901-02, 8963. 
41 R. 8614, 8963, 9070-71. 
42 R. 8655-59; Trial Ex. 2. 
43 Trial Ex. 34. 
44 R. 8656. 
45 R. 8655-60, 8859-60. 
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In June 2008, when he was overwhelmed with 108 litigation files, Highberg 
filed a second complaint in Oregon, wherein he again asserted that Ms. 
Kranendonk had "suffered injuries to her neck, back, and knees," and he 
r.iP calculated her damages to be at least $623,098.65.46 
In August 2008, just days before the service deadline, the Kranendonks left 
Highberg a message asking when trial would be.47 Upon receiving the message, 
he wrote: "These people are becoming a pain [in] the ass"; "I will call [them] back 
today to explain (again) we are years away [from trial]."48 Highberg's statement 
about trial was misleading since he knew that Oregon rules required civil cases 
to be set for trial within one year of filing.49 Mr. Kranendonk testified as follows 
about his August 2008 conversation with Highberg: 
Q. 
A. 
When you did talk with Mr. Highberg, Ron, about the case 
and he said it was a long way off, did he tell you that he had 
concerns with your case? What was he saying about the case? 
No. There was no discussion with concerns. He just more or 
less told us you know things were going along fine and we 
figured, with it being out there a ways, everything was still 
moving along as expected. so 
46 R. 8639; Trial Ex. 3. 
47 R. 8643; Trial Ex. 6 at DEF0033. 
48 Id. 
C@ 49 Id. 
so R. 8916-17. 
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A few days later, Highberg again failed to timely serve the truckers, but 
this time that failure was fatal- the statute of limitations had passed.51 
Deception and Cover-up 
Highberg did not realize until November 2008 that he had missed the 
statute of limitations.52 The Swapp Firm knew this was a "catastrophe" and 
would likely result in "severe financial loss and hardship" for Ms. Kranendonk; 
and, on November 13, 2009, Defendants moved for an extension of the time to 
serve the truckers, claiming they were "long haul truck drivers[,] making 
personal service upon the[m] difficult."53 That claim was false.54 
On November 19, 2008, the Kranendonks again called to ask about a trial 
date. 55 This time High berg wrote: "This client is a moron. She is calling 
constantly asking when her trial date is. I have told her several times we wo[n't] 
get the trial date until we certify it ready for trial which won't happen until 
discovery is complete."56 
51 R. 8625-26, 8646. 
52 R. 8627. 
53 R. 8613, 8632-33, 8836-38, 8860. 
54 R. 8633-41. 
55 Trial Ex. 6 at DEF0033. 
56 Jd. 
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Highberg did not tell Ms. Kranendonk he had missed the statute of 
limitations.57 Of the November 19, 2008 conversation with Highberg, Mr. 
Kranendonk testified: 
Q. . .. When you and Jodi were calling even later in the fall of 
2008, what was the message that you were getting from Mr. 
Highberg about when trial was going to be? 
A. The message that I was getting [was] that it would be a ways 
out and things were still moving along as planned. 
Q. And in fall of 2008, when you're talking with Mr. Highberg's 
office Ron, did he ever say anything to you about we've 
missed this deadline[?] ... 
A. No, [he did] not.58 
Highberg finally called the firm's Salt Lake office in January 2009 to report 
his malpractice, but neither he nor anyone else told Ms. Kranendonk of the 
malpractice. 59 
In February 2009, the Kranendonks called Highberg to update him 
regarding Ms. Kranendonk's medical care.60 Again, Highberg did not tell them 
57 R. 8648. 
58 R. 8918. 
~ 59 R. 8651-55, 8924. 
60 R. 8923-24; Trial Ex. 6 at DEF0034. 
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the statute of limitations had run.61 Instead, he hired Kevin Lafky, an Oregon 
attorney, to file an appeal, but he did not tell Ms. Kranendonk about the appeal.62 
The Swapp Firm called the Kranendonks in March 2009, but only "to check 
on [the] status of issues"; the Kranendonks called back and reported that Ms. 
Kranendonk had been put on catastrophic leave at her work.63 Mr. Kranendonk 
again asked about a trial date, and Highberg's paralegal said she would "find out 
and let him know when he call[ed the next day]."64 No one mentioned the 
missed statute of limitations, and no one called the Kranendonks back.65 Instead, 
Highberg made a "conscious decision" 66 to conceal his fatal mistake from Ms. 
Kranendonk: 
Q. And at the time that you're not disclosing this to her when they 
call on November 19, 2008, you don't tell her that you missed the 
statute of limitations deadline on this date because you care for 
her so much? 
A. I didn't tell her because I thought that we had a good chance 
of prevailing at that [motion to dismiss] hearing in May. 
Q. And why couldn't you have told Jodi, Jodi we missed your 
statute of limitations, but we have a good chance of prevailing 
at a hearing? 
61 R. 8923-24. 
62 R. 8664; Trial Ex. 6 at DEF0035. 
63 R. 8664-65; Trial Ex. 6 at DEF0035. 
64 Trial Ex. 6 at DEF0035. 
65 R. 8666; Trial Ex. 6 at DEF0035-36. 
66 R. 8660. 
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A. I could have. I could have. It was a judgment decision that I 
made at that time.67 
When he finally told Ms. Kranendonk in May or June 2009 that he had 
"dropped the ball," Highberg said that the reason he did not timely serve the 
truckers was "because they were long-haulers."68 Again, that was not true.69 He 
also told her "he would take care of [her]," but he did not disclose the conflict his 
<@ malpractice had created, as Mr. Kranendonk testified: 
Q. Did Mr. Highberg talk to you about a conflict of interest? 
A. No. 
Q. Did he explain what a conflict of interest meant? .... 
A. No. 
Q. Did you talk to - well did they tell you to go get your own attorney? 
A. No. 
Q. Did they tell you to talk to anybody? 
A. No. He told us that he had a friend that would be getting a 
hold of us, Greg. ["Greg" was the firm's insurance-retained 
counsel, Greg Sanders. 70] 
Q. And did you ask them about getting your own attorney, 
whether you should or shouldn't? 
A. Yes, Jodi did.71 
67 R. 8797-98. 
68 R. 8959. 
69 R. 8633-3 7. 
70 R. 9002, 9086. 
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Nor did the firm tell Highberg to advise Ms. Kranendonk to consult with 
independent counsel, as Highberg testified: 
Q. Now did anyone at the Swapp firm tell you that you should 
reach out and contact the Kranendonks about this problem? 
A. 
Q. 
I don't recall anyone giving me specifically that advice, no. 
Did anybody tell you to reach out to the Kranendonks that 
they should maybe be talking to their own attorney about the 
situation they were in? 
A. No.72 
The Contract and Consequences of Breach 
In its fee agreement, the Swapp Firm agreed to "use [its] best efforts." 73 
Craig Swapp testified as to what he understood that obligation to mean: 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
71 R. 8929. 
72 R. 8655. 
73 R. 9036. 
Now best efforts includes professionally and competently 
handling the client's claims, true? 
True. 
And part of your agreement with your client is that you will 
follow [the ethical] rules [for lawyers]. 
Yes. 
[Those rules r]equire you to keep your clients informed 
honestly and fully. 
Yes. 
16 
® 
. @ 
® 
@ 
~ 
(@ 
@ 
~ 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
And there's another ethical rule in Utah about conflicts of interest. 
You have to as a lawyer avoid a conflict of interest, right? 
Yes. 
And if the conflict of interest develops you have to inform the 
client, right? 
A. True. 
Q. And that's what you're agreeing to-that's part of your 
agreement with a client when they sign that line at the bottom 
of the agreement, that's what they're getting, right? 
A. That's the hope, yes. 
Q. That's part of the best efforts, right? 
A. That's right. 74 
He also testified as to what would happen if his firm breached those obligations: 
Q. Now once a client, because of a conflict of interest or because 
of you know any of these breaches that we've talked about, 
because the statute of limitations has run, you understand the 
A. 
Q. 
client at that point, once they go get another attorney, they are 
going to incur attorneys costs and expense, true? 
Generally yes. 
And it's going to be a serious - well it's going to be mental 
distress for the client, true? 
A. True. 
Q. They're going to worry about what's going to happen in the 
future, true? 
A. True. 
74 R. 9036-41 (emphasis added). 
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Q. How is this all going to get resolved? That can be very 
stressful for a client. 
A. Yeah, it should be. 
Q. To have gone clear down the road, because we're a long time 
past this collision now, to have gone all that way down the 
road and to have trusted that our case is being handled 
properly, that can create a lot of mental stress, true? 
A. Certainly.75 
Highberg also testified that if an attorney does not "do [his] job well" the result 
can be II emotionally catastrophic" for the client. 76 
Emotional Distress 
Highberg knew that Ms. Kranendonk was particularly susceptible to 
emotional distress, as he testified: "[F]rom the very time that I first spoke to her, 
she was just what I would describe as a very anxious person and I don't know 
how else to put it other than that. She was intimidated by lawyers .... " 77 As 
Highberg anticipated, Ms. Kranendonk was distressed when she learned of 
Defendants' malpractice, as Mr. Kranendonk testified: 
Q. From your perspective as you looked at Jod[i] when she got 
the news that her case was dead, what [did that] do to her? 
A. She was devastated. 
Q. What was it like that day on the phone? 
75 R. 9061-62. 
76 R. 8612-13. 
77 R. 8650. 
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A. Oh, she was hysterical. I mean she was crying because not knowing 
where we were going to go from there. I remember asking Erik 
[Highberg] what are we going to do with all-you know, we have 
all these medical bills. Where are we going to go from here?78 
Ms. Kranendonk twice testified similarly, first on direct examination: 
Q. How did you feel when you heard that your case was dead? 
A. I was devastated. I didn't know where I would go from there.79 
c.;; The second time was in response to a question posed by the court: 
[Q.] Okay. Did you have any questions you felt were unanswered 
by Mr. Highberg when he made that call to you in May or 
June of 2009 about the case's dismissal. Were there any 
questions that you felt he didn't answer for you and, as a 
follow-up to that, if there were questions did you call the Salt 
Lake office of the Swapp firm to ask those questions that you 
felt were unanswered? So kind of two parts to that one. 
A. No. Once he told us that the ball had been dropped I was 
devastated. I didn't know any other questions to ask. I had 
never had that kind of a situation happen to me.80 
@ Craig Swapp conceded that Ms. Kranendonk suffered years of distress: 
Q. I mean there's been mounds of paper, court documents, 
pleadings that have been produced in this case since then, true? 
A. That's true. 
Q. Since the malpractice occurred, true? 
A. 
78 R. 8930. 
@ 79 R. 8972. 
80 R. 9008. 
True. 
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Q. And years of stress and worry for the Kranendonks, true? 
A. True.81 
Defense counsel tried to get Ms. Kranendonk's expert to concede that the 
only damages in this case were those associated with the underlying injury 
claim, but the expert affirmed that this case also involved "emotional harm" due 
to "what happened between the lawyer and the client": 
Q. And you understand that in the attorney malpractice case 
we're trying here today we're trying the case within a case. 
You agree with that, right? 
A. 
Q. 
Well yes. 
And we're asking the Jury to evaluate the underlying accident 
and determine what if anything Ms. Kranendonk lost by the 
malpractice of Mr. Highberg, right? 
A. Well I assume that you 're also evaluating the emotional harm and 
the six year delay and all of those other things ... 
Q. 
A. 
But at its core we're here to talk about the accident and what its 
resulting value was, right? 
I don't know if it's [at] its core, because to me it would involve a lot 
more than that when you're dealing with what happened between the 
lawyer and the client, but I understand that's part of the case.82 
"I was trying to protect her." 
Highberg testified that he acted as he did because he wanted to protect Ms. 
Kranendonk and take care of her: 
81 R. 9087. 
82 R. 9297-98 (emphasis added). 
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Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Now at this point you didn't call the Kranendonks, did you? 
No. 
Now the fact that her case is dead and might not be able to be 
resuscitated, might never come back to life, isn't that the sort 
of information an attorney hates to give to a client? 
... [W]e had a hearing date set for May of 2009 to determine 
whether or not our efforts to resuscitate this case would be 
successful and it was my feeling that we would prevail ... so I 
tried not to alarm her ... [.] [Y]ou know she's my client. I'm 
trying to protect her. I'm trying to make her feel better .... 
That's the only reason. 83 
He reaffirmed: 
Q. But you chose not to talk to your clients? 
A. In this case that's correct. 
Q. And why? . 
A. . .. It would burden her and so in all honestly maybe it seems 
strange to say it, but I was trying to protect her .... 84 
~ Finally, he emphasized: 
@ 
(j 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Did Ms. Kranendonk know Mr. Lafky was now representing her? 
I don't think so. 
Why didn't you talk to Ms. Kranendonk about that? 
. .. Again, I was absolutely trying to keep her from having to 
stress over these legal wranglings which she may or may not 
have understood to begin with. That was the point. 
Q. You just wanted to take care of the client. 
(@ 83 R. 8629-30. 
84 R. 8649-50. 
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A. I did. 85 
After Highberg testified that he wanted to protect Ms. Kranendonk and 
take care of her, her counsel sought to introduce his statements about her being 
"a pain in the ass" and "a moron." 86 The trial court denied the request, saying: 
"[I]t just appears that he was making a note to himself to suggest that there were 
times she was a little irritating and he was getting a little impatient."87 
The jury did not award punitive damages.88 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Noneconomic damages for breach of contract 
Defendants challenge the award of noneconomic damages. Noneconomic 
damages are recoverable for breach of contract if they were foreseeable and 
explicitly contemplated when contracting. The jury found that noneconomic 
damages were a foreseeable consequence of the Swapp Firm's breach, and 
undisputed evidence shows that the Swapp Firm explicitly contemplated 
noneconomic damages in the event that it breached the contract. Thus, the Court 
should affirm the award of noneconomic damages based on the Swapp Firm's 
breach of contract. 
85 R. 8663-64. 
86 R. 8778-88. 
87 R. 8788. 
88 R. 6575. 
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2. Noneconomic damages for willful breach of fiduciary duty 
The Court should affirm the award of noneconomic damages based on 
Defendants' breach of fiduciary duty as well. The jury found that Defendants 
breached their fiduciary duties, and the evidence supports that finding. 
Undisputed evidence also shows that the breaches were willful. An apparent 
majority of jurisdictions have held that noneconomic damages are recoverable 
for an attorney's willful breach of loyalty, and the reasons that led this Court to 
hold that they are recoverable for an insurer's willful breach of good faith should 
lead it to also conclude that they are recoverable for an attorney's willful breach 
of fiduciary duty. 
3. Attorney fees for breach of fiduciary duty 
This Court has held that attorney fees are recoverable for breach of 
fiduciary duty and applied that rule in the insurance context. The Court of 
Appeals has applied that rule in other contexts. This Court should recognize that 
the rule it has applied to insurers also applies to attorneys. Additionally, it 
should hold that a lodestar analysis is not required here; or, if it is, the Court 
should (1) remand to allow consideration of lodestar evidence or (2) affirm the 
award of fees based on the lodestar evidence already in the record. 
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4. Litigation expenses for breach of fiduciary duty 
Litigation expenses are recoverable for breach of fiduciary duty when the 
fiduciary's litigation conduct is largely responsible for those expenses. 
Defendants are largely responsible for Ms. Kranendonk's expenses: they forced 
her to litigate the truckers' liability, even though the truckers admitted liability; 
they forced her to litigate whether she was injured, even though they said she 
sustained II massive injuries"; they contested their breach of contract and breach 
of fiduciary duty for six years, only to admit at trial their conduct that plainly 
constitutes breaches of fiduciary duty and breach of contract. 
5. Derogatory comments about Ms. Kranendonk 
Ms. Kranendonk's punitive damages claim required proof that Defendants 
acted with knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, her 
rights. Highberg' s trial testimony implied that his conduct was motivated by a 
personal solicitude that he felt for Ms. Kranendonk. As her attorney, however, he 
called her II a pain in the ass" and II a moron." The trial court excluded those 
comments under rule 403 without conducting a rule 403 analysis. Even under a 
rule 403 analysis, it abused its discretion by excluding those comments because 
they were the only evidence that could effectively rebut the implication of 
Highberg's self-serving testimony. This Court should hold that Highberg's 
comments are admissible and remand for retrial of the punitive damages issue. 
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I. 
ARGUMENT 
THE AWARD OF NONECONOMIC DAMAGES WAS PROPER 
UNDER MS. KRANENDONK'S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM.89 
"'Clients wronged by their lawyers may sue for damages based on breach 
of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, or negligence."' Christensen & Jensen, P.C. v. 
Barrett & Daines, 2008 UT 64, ,r 21, 194 P.3d 931 (citation omitted). Here, Ms. 
~ Kranendonk brought and prevailed on each of these types of claims and was 
awarded noneconomic damages. The Court should hold that the award of 
noneconomic damages was appropriate under her breach of contract and breach 
of fiduciary duty claims.90 
The Court has established a two-part test for determining when 
noneconomic damages are recoverable for breach of contract. See Cabaness v. 
Thomas, 2010 UT 23, ,r 75,232 P.3d 486. "[A] non-breaching party may recover 
general and/ or consequential damages related to emotional distress or mental 
anguish arising from a breach of contract when such damages were both [1] a 
89 The noneconomic damages referred to herein are those awarded independent 
of the underlying personal injury claim. 
90 In responding to Defendants' JNOV motion on the issue of noneconomic 
damages, Ms. Kranendonk did not rely on her negligence-based claims. (R. 7110, 
7125-26.) Nor does she rely on them here. "When a civil case is submitted to a 
jury on several alternative theories and the jury does not identify which theory or 
theories it relied on in reaching its verdict, [the Court] may affirm the verdict if 
the jury could have properly found for the prevailing party on any one of the 
theories presented." Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 467 (Utah 
1996). 
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foreseeable result of the breach of contract and [2] explicitly within the 
contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was entered into." Id. 
Defendants have not argued and, thus, have waived the argument that the 
Swapp Firm's breach of contract did not cause Ms. Kranendonk emotional 
distress. See Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ,r 8, 194 P.3d 903. Defendants also fail to 
say which part of the Cabaness test they believe is unsupported by sufficient 
evidence. (Br. of Appellants 20-24.) Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence to 
satisfy both parts of that test, and Defendants' arguments otherwise are 
unsupported by the law or the evidence. 
A. Sufficient evidence supports the finding that emotional 
distress damages were a foreseeable result of the Swapp 
Firm's breach of contract. 
The district court instructed the jury, as follows, that to award 
noneconomic damages for breach of contract, it would need to find that 
emotional distress was a foreseeable result of the breach: 
If a party recovers damages for the benefits she expected to receive 
from the contract, then that party is entitled to recover consequential 
damages caused by the Swapp Firm's breach. 
Consequential damages are those losses or injuries reasonably within the 
contemplation of the parties, that is, they could have considered them or 
reasonably foreseen them, at the time the contract was made. This may include 
emotional distress and mental suffering. 
In order to decide whether a loss or an injury was foreseeable at the 
time the contract was made, you should examine the nature and language 
of the contract and the reasonable expectations of the parties .... 
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(R. 6547-48 (emphasis added).) The jury then found "that the Swapp Firm's 
breach of contract was a cause of [noneconomic] damages to [Ms. Kranendonk]." 
(R. 657 4.) Given the court's instructions, and to the extent the jury's award of 
@ noneconomic damages was based on breach of contract, encompassed in that 
award is a finding that noneconomic damages were foreseeable. 
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Ample evidence supports that finding. Highberg testified that if an 
attorney does not "do [his] job well" -i.e., he breaches his contract-the result 
can be "emotionally catastrophic" for the client. (R. 8612-13.) Craig Swapp 
likewise testified that emotional distress is a foreseeable consequence of breach 
of contract in a case like this: 
Q. Now once a client, because of a conflict of interest or because 
of you know any of these breaches that we've talked about, 
because the statute of limitations has run, you understand the 
client at that point, once they go get another attorney, they are 
going to incur attorneys costs and expense, true? 
A. Generally yes. 
Q. And it's going to be ... mental distress for the client, true? 
A. True. 
Q. They're going to worry about what's going to happen in the 
future, true? 
A. True. 
Q. How is this all going to get resolved? That can be very 
stressful for a client. 
A. Yeah, it should be. 
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Q. To have gone clear down the road, because we're a long time 
past this collision now, to have gone all that way down the 
road and to have trusted that our case is being handled 
properly, that can create a lot of mental stress, true? 
A. Certainly. 
(R. 9026, 9061-62.) Thus, Defendants' testimony establishes that the first part of 
the Cabaness test is satisfied, and Defendants offer no clear argument to the 
contrary (see Br. of Appellants 20-24). 
B. Undisputed evidence supports a finding that emotional 
distress damages in the event of a breach of contract were 
explicitly contemplated by the Swapp Firm. 
While the jury instructions addressed the first part of the Cabaness test-
whether emotional distress damages were foreseeable- they did not address the 
second part-whether emotional distress damages were explicitly contemplated in 
the event of a breach. (R. 6547-48.) The lack of such a question on the verdict 
form, however, does not undermine the award of noneconomic damages for 
breach of contract here. 
"[T]o reverse a trial verdict, [a] court must find not a mere possibility, but 
a reasonable likelihood that [an] error [in jury instructions] affected the result." 
Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, if 20,993 P.2d 191; cf Uhrhahn Constr. & Design, 
Inc. v. Hopkins, 2008 UT App 41, if 29, 179 P.3d 808 ("[W]hen a trial court [in a 
bench trial] fails to make factual findings on a material issue, such failure [does 
not] constitute[] reversible error ... [if] the undisputed evidence clearly 
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establishes the missing findings[.]"). Undisputed evidence shows that the Swapp 
Firm explicitly contemplated emotional distress damages if it breached its 
contract. 
In Cabaness, the Court identified a provision of the relevant contract that 
obligated the employer defendant to "not tolerate verbal or physical conduct by 
any employee which harasses, disrupts, or interferes with another's work 
performance or which creates an intimidating, offensive, or hostile work 
environment." 2010 UT 23, ,r 76. The Court observed that this provision was 
"specifically directed toward matters of mental concern and solicitude, any 
breach [of which] may [have] result[ed] in emotional distress and mental 
anguish." Id. The Court then concluded that that provision "[gave] rise to the 
possibility that emotional damages were within the contemplation of the parties 
(@ at the time the contract was entered." Id. 
Here, Craig Swapp identified the "best efforts" provision of his firm's 
~ contract and testified, as follows, that this provision is directed toward matters of 
mental concern, the breach of which may result in emotional-distress: 
Q. Now [the] best efforts [provision of your fee agreement] 
includes professionally and competently handling the client's 
claims, true? 
A. True. 
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Q. And part of your agreement with your client is that you will 
follow [the ethical] rules [for lawyers]. 
A. Yes. 
Q. [Those rules r]equire you to keep your clients informed 
honestly and fully. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And there's another ethical rule in Utah about conflicts of interest. 
You have to as a lawyer avoid a conflict of interest, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if the conflict of interest develops you have to inform the 
client, right? 
A. True. 
Q. 
A. 
And that's what you're agreeing to-that's part of your 
agreement with a client when they sign that line at the bottom 
of the agreement, that's what they're getting, right? 
That's the hope, yes. 
Q. That's part of the best efforts, right? 
A. That's right. 
(R. 9036-41; see also R. 9042-43.) 
Q. Now once a client, because of a conflict of interest or because 
of you know any of these breaches that we've talked about, 
because the statute of limitations has run, you understand the 
client at that point, once they go get another attorney, they are 
going to incur attorneys costs and expense, true? 
A. Generally yes. 
Q. And it's going to be a serious-well it's going to be mental 
distress for the client, true? 
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A. True. 
Q. They're going to worry about what's going to happen in the 
future, true? 
A. True. 
Q. How is this all going to get resolved? That can be very 
stressful for a client. 
A. Yeah, it should be. 
(R. 9061-62.) Unlike in Cabaness, the relevant contractual provision here does not 
present only the possibilihJ that emotional distress damages were contemplated at 
~ the time of contracting. Here, Craig Swapp testified to a certainhJ that he knew 
' that a breach of the "best efforts" provision could result in emotional distress. He 
also testified that his firm's "website states that [ the firm] eliminates the stress 
and uncertainty of dealing with your accident" (R. 9081) and that eliminating the 
stress a client feels having to deal with an injury claim is his firm's "goal." (Id.) 
That the Swapp Firm consciously made elimination of a client's emotional 
distress its goal, advertised that goal, and included in its contract a provision, the 
breach of which it knew could result in emotional distress, shows that it 
explicitly contemplated emotional distress damages in the event it breached its 
@ contract. Because the evidence to this effect is undisputed, there is no reasonable 
likelihood that the absence of a question about this part of the Cabaness test on 
the verdict form affected the result of trial. Thus, the second part of the Cabaness 
test should be deemed satisfied. See Cheves, 1999 UT 86, 120. 
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C. Defendants' arguments against a finding that the Cabaness test 
has been met are unsupported by the law or the evidence. 
Defendants offer four arguments against a finding that the Cabaness test 
has been met. First, they say that "unlike Cabaness, Ms. Kranendonk's contract 
with the Swapp Firm did not include any provisions 'specifically directed toward 
matters of mental concern."' (Br. of Appellant 22.) However, as shown above, the 
"best efforts" provision is specifically directed to matters of mental concern. 
Second, Defendants note that their contract made no warranties about the 
outcome of Ms. Kranendonk's injury case. (Id.) However, the fact that the Swapp 
Firm did not guarantee a favorable outcome does not mean that it did not 
contemplate emotional distress damages if it lost the case through negligence. 
Moreover, the Swapp Firm did not breach its contract only by losing the injury 
case. It also breached its contract by concealing facts from Ms. Kranendonk, 
deceiving her, and putting its interests ahead of hers. (R. 8644-45, 8648, 8918, 
8923-24, 8655, 8660, 8664, 8666, 8797-98, 8929, 8959, 9297-98.) 
Third, Defendants observe that exaggerated statements of opinion or 
puffery do not form a part of a sales contract, and they argue that the statement 
on the firm's website about eliminating the stress and uncertainty of dealing with ~ 
an accident "does not form a part of the contract between Ms. Kranendonk and 
the Swapp Firm." (Id. at 22-23.) The statements on the firm's website may not be 
part of the contract, but Cabaness does not require a contractual provision 
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promising to eliminate stress by pe1fonning the contract. See 2010 UT 23, ,r 75. 
Instead, Cabaness requires evidence that emotional distress damages were 
explicitly contemplated in the event of a breach. See id. ,r 75. The statement on the 
I@ Swapp Firm's website is such evidence, as is Craig Swapp' s testimony about the 
contract's "best efforts" provision. 
Finally, Defendants argue that this case is insufficiently '"rare"' and 
"'unusual'" and that, if noneconomic damages are allowed here, "such damages 
would be available in every breach of contract claim." (Br. of Appellants' 23-24.) 
Defendants' assertion is plain hyperbole. Moreover, this is a "rare" and 
"unusual" case: The Court's experience will confirm that in breach of contract 
cases against attorneys it is not typical for the attorney to have explicitly 
advertised that he will eliminate client stress; testified that his contract contains a 
provision which, if breached, will result in the client's emotional distress; and 
breached that provision through deceit, concealment, and putting of his interests 
ahead of those of the client. 
In sum, the Court should conclude that sufficient evidence supports a 
finding that the Cabaness test has been satisfied; and, because Defendants do not 
dispute that Ms. Kranendonk suffered emotional distress because of their breach 
of contract, the award of noneconomic damages should be affirmed. 
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II. THIS COURT SHOULD HOLD THAT NONECONOMIC DAMAGES 
ARE RECOVERABLE FOR DEFENDANTS' WILLFUL BREACHES OF 
FIDUCIARY DUTY. 
A. Case law from this jurisdiction and others supports a 
holding that noneconomic damages are recoverable for an 
attorney's willful breach of fiduciary duty. 
The "vast majority" of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have 
distinguished between malpractice based on inadvertent breaches of duty and 
malpractice "premised on intentional acts, physical injury, or particularly 
egregious conduct." Vincent v. De Vries, 72 A.3d 886, 894 (Vt. 2013). An apparent 
majority of jurisdictions allows recovery of noneconomic damages when an 
attorney commits a willful breach of fiduciary duty. 91 For this Court to not also 
hold that noneconomic damages are recoverable for an attorney's willful breach 
91 See, e.g., David C. Joel, Attorney at Law, P.C. v. Chastain, 562 S.E.2d 746, 750 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2002) (holding mental distress damages recoverable where "the conduct 
resulting in [a] breach of fiduciary duty was intentional or showed a reckless 
indifference to consequences equivalent to intent"); Reed v. Mitchell & Timbanard, 
P.C., 903 P.2d 621,627 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) ("[T]he rule disallowing recovery for 
emotional distress does not apply if the attorney's conduct involves ... 
intentional conduct, a willful fiduciary breach or physical contact."); Boros v. 
Baxley, 621 So. 2d 240, 244-45 (Ala. 1993) (indicating that emotional distress 
damages may be recovered if "the alleged [attorney] malpractice involved 
'affirmative wrongdoing,"' not "'neglect of duty"' (citation omitted)); Bowman v. 
DoherhJ, 686 P.2d 112, 118 (Kan. 1984) (stating that when attorney malpractice 
includes "willful or wanton wrongs" emotional distress damages are 
recoverable); Ronald E. Mallen & Allison Martin Rhodes, 3 Legal Malpractice 
§ 21:19 (2016 ed.) (indicating that noneconomic damages are recoverable if they 
result from" a fiduciary breach that was ... an intentional tort"). 
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of fiduciary duty would be inconsistent with the principles undergirding Beck v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). 
In Beck, this Court held that an insurer's breach of the covenant of good 
faith could support a claim for noneconomic damages. Id. at 802. The Court gave 
two reasons for that holding. See id. at 801-02. First, it explained that because 
"insurance frequently is purchased not only to provide funds in case of loss, but 
[also] to provide peace of mind," a breach of the insurance contract could, "in 
unusual cases, [lead to] damages for mental anguish." Id. at 802. 
By "unusual cases," the Court apparently meant cases where the insurer's 
breach was willful. See id. at 799,802 n.6. That is because the Court explained that 
"even an inadvertent breach of the covenant of good faith ... warrants [some] 
remedy," id. at 799, but then noted that noneconomic damages would not be 
~ recoverable "for the mere disappointment, frustration, or anxiety normally 
experienced in the process of filing an insurance claim and negotiating a 
settlement," id. at 802 n.6. In other words, noneconomic damages appear not to 
be recoverable for an insurer's inadvertent delay in offering a settlement, but an 
intentional delay of settlement "while pressures build on the insured" does 
appear to support an award of noneconomic damages. See id. at 798, 802. 
The same reasoning applies to an attorney's willful breach of fiduciary 
duty. Just as insurance is frequently obtained to provide peace of mind, an 
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attorney is also frequently retained to provide peace of mind. See Utah State Bar v. 
Jarine, 2012 UT 67, ,r,r 38-39, 289 P.3d 516 (stating that "the primary result 
obtained [by the attorney] was peace of mind"); Schmidt v. Coogan, 335 P.3d 424, 
439 (Wash. 2014) ("People hire attorneys for the peace of mind that comes from 
having the assistance of a professional, rather than facing a lawsuit alone."); In re 
Pressly, 628 A.2d 927, 931 (Vt. 1993) (same). 
Certainly the Court does not view an attorney's willful breach of loyalty as 
less serious than an insurer's breach of good faith. The Court has said: 
Critical to the attorney-client relationship and the integrity of 
judicial proceedings is an attorney's duty to represent the interests 
of a client with zeal and loyalty. The duty of loyalty is so essential to 
the proper functioning of the judicial system that its faithful 
discharge is mandated not only by the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, but also, in criminal cases, by the Sixth Amendment right 
of a criminal defendant to the effective assistance of counsel. 
State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357,359 (Utah 1994). Thus, because insurers, who sell 
peace of mind, may be liable for emotional distress when they willfully breach 
their covenant of good faith, attorneys, who sell peace of mind, should also be 
liable for emotional distress when they willfully breach their duty of loyalty. 
The Court's second reason for allowing noneconomic damages in the first-
party insurance context was to "remove any incentive for [insurer's to] breach[] 
the duty of good faith." Beck, 701 P.2d at 801-02. The same reasoning applies 
here. If attorneys know when they negligently miss a statute of limitations that 
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they can never be liable for noneconomic damages caused by thereafter 
breaching their duty of loyalty, negligent attorneys will be incentivized to 
deceive their clients, conceal their malpractice, and fail to disclose the conflicts 
t@ created by their negligence. To remove any incentive for attorneys to willfully 
breach their duty of loyalty, noneconomic damages must be allowed for an 
attorney's willful breach of fiduciary duty. Any other conclusion would trivialize 
attorneys' breaches of the duty of loyalty and send the message that this Court 
will hold the insurance industry fully accountable for intentional misconduct but 
not hold the bar fully accountable for comparable misconduct. 92 
B. The jury found that Defendants breached their fiduciary 
duties, and the undisputed evidence is that those breaches 
were willful. 
The trial court informed the jury that "an attorney owes a client a fiduciary 
(.jj duty of loyalty, which requires the attorney to exercise impeccable honesty, fair 
dealing, and fidelity in dealings with the client." (R. 6542.) The trial court then 
instructed the jury that for it to find that Defendants breached their fiduciary 
duties, Ms. Kranendonk must prove that one or both of them: 
92 Defendants urge the Court to hold that noneconomic damages are 
unrecoverable for willful breaches of fiduciary duty unless physical symptoms 
accompany the distress. They rely on Utah law that requires physical symptoms 
in negligence cases, and they cite a case interpreting a stalking statute. (Br. of 
Appellants at 34 (citing Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 
1993); Carlton v. Brown, 2014 UT 6, 323 P.3d 571; Baird v. Baird, 2014 UT 8, 322 
P.3d 728).) But they cite no authority for the assertion that physical symptoms are 
needed to support noneconomic damages for willful breach of fiduciary duty. 
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(A) conceal[ed] important facts or law from Jodi Kranendonk; 
and/or 
(B) deceiv[ed] Jodi Kranendonk; and/ or 
(C) plac[ed] their own interests ahead of the interests of Jodi 
Kranendonk by failing to inform Mrs. Kranendonk of a conflict of 
interest created by the Swapp Firm's and/ or Erik Highberg' s acts 
and omissions; and/ or 
(D) fail[ ed] to advise Jodi Kranendonk to seek other competent 
counsel after a conflict of interest arose between the Swapp Firm 
and/ or Erik Highberg and Jodi Kranendonk[.] 
(Id.) The jury then found, and Defendants do not dispute, "that the Swapp Firm 
breached a fiduciary duty owed to Jodi Kranendonk." (R. 657 4.) Thus, the jury 
found that Defendants deceived Ms. Kranendonk, concealed important facts, 
placed firm interests ahead of hers, and/ or chose not to inform her of their 
conflict of interest. 
"[W]illful misconduct "'includes a conscious or intentional violation of 
definite law or [a] rule of conduct with the knowledge of the peril to be 
apprehended from such act or failure to act.""' Chang v. Soldier Summit Dev., 1999 
UT App 27U, 1999 WL 33244616, at *1 (mem.) (quoting Roylance v. Davies, 424 
P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1967)). The jury in this case was not asked to determine 
whether Defendants' breaches of fiduciary duty were willful. (See R. 6573-75.) 
But the undisputed evidence is that they were. And that is sufficient.93 
93 See supra p. 28 (citing Cheves, 1999 UT 86, ,r 20 ("[T]o reverse a trial verdict, [a] 
court must find not a mere possibility, but a reasonable likelihood that [an] error 
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Highberg's undisputed testimony was that his concealment of the missed 
statute of limitations was a "conscious decision." (R. 8797-98.) Likewise, he 
testified that by November 19, 2008, he knew he had missed the statute of 
($ limitations (R. 8627, 8632), yet his case notes and Mr. Kranendonk' s testimony 
confirm that, in the face of that knowledge, he responded to the Kranendonks' 
inquiry that day by saying that "things were still moving along as planned." (R. 
8918; Trial Ex. 6 at DEF0033.) Thus, the undisputed evidence is that his deception 
was also conscious and intentional. 
The undisputed evidence also carries a strong inference that Defendants 
made a conscious choice not to tell Ms. Kranendonk of their conflict of interest, 
thereby putting their interests ahead of hers. Craig Swapp testified that "if [a] 
conflict of interest develops you have to inform the client."(R. 9041.) Yet no one 
~ at the firm told Highberg to inform Ms. Kranendonk of the conflict. (R. 8655.) In 
fact, Mr. Kranendonk's undisputed testimony was that the Swapp Firm did not 
tell Ms. Kranendonk of the conflict or advise her to seek other counsel, even 
when she specifically asked whether she should. (R. 8929.) 
[in jury instructions] affected the result."); cf Uhrhalm Constr. & Design, 2008 UT 
App 41, ,r 29 ("[W]hen a trial court [in a bench trial] fails to make factual findings 
on a material issue, such failure [ does not] constitute[] reversible error ... [if] the 
undisputed evidence clearly establishes the missing findings[.]")). 
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Finally, Craig Swapp testified, on behalf of the Swapp Firm, that he knew 
that concealment, deception, and putting firm interests ahead of client interests 
would" certainly" result in various injuries to the client. (R. 9026, 9061-62.) 
Given the foregoing, undisputed evidence, Defendants' breaches of 
fiduciary duty amounted to conscious and intentional violations of definite rules 
of conduct with knowledge of the peril to be apprehended from such conduct. In 
other words, they were undisputedly willful. See Chang, 1999 UT App 27U, 1999 
WL 33244616, at *1. 
Defendants argue that the jury rejected a finding of willful misconduct 
because it did not award punitive damages. (Br. of Appellants 27-28.) However, 
the burden of proof for breach of fiduciary duty is preponderance of the 
evidence, Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 153 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), while the 
burden of proof for punitive damages is clear and convincing evidence, Utah 
Code Ann.§ 78B-8-201 (2012), and the jury was so instructed (R. 6531-32, 9967, 
9987). Accordingly, the verdict on punitive damages is not an indication that the 
jury rejected a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendants' 
breaches of fiduciary duty were willful. 
Defendants also argue that Highberg's intentional breaches of fiduciary 
duty do not qualify as "willful" under Bowman v. DoherhJ, 686 P.2d 112 (Kan. 
1984). (Br. of Appellants 29.) Defendants argue that in order "[t]o qualify as 
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'willful' under Bowman, the attorney malpractice must involve 'an intentional act 
and intentional injury."' (Id.) While they concede that there is evidence Highberg 
intentionally breached his duty of loyalty (see Br. of Appellants 30), they argue 
~ that there is no evidence that he intentionally injured Ms. Kranendonk. (Id. at 30-
31.) Defendants' analysis is misleading. The Bowman court allowed emotional 
distress damages for "willful or wanton wrongs." 686 P.2d at 118 (emphasis 
added). It defined a "willful wrong" as one that II involves an intentional act and 
intentional injury," but it defined a "wanton wrong" as one that "involves an 
intentional act but not an intentional injury." Id. (emphasis added). Under 
Bowman, Highberg's conduct would be wanton and would therefore support an 
award of noneconomic damages. See id. 94 
Finally, Defendants argue that "Highberg's conduct is insufficiently 
@ egregious to support an award of non-economic damages." (Br. of Appellants 
31.) They note that "[i]n David C. Joel, there was evidence that the attorney 
94 Defendants also mistake the holding of Boros v. Baxley, 621 So.2d 240 (Ala. 
1993). They say that case holds that there cay be "no recovery of non-economic 
damages in a legal malpractice case absent' affirmative wrongdoing' in a 
relationship that was 'predominantly personal in nature."' (Br. of Appellants 29 
(emphasis added).) But Defendants conflate two separate holdings. See id. at 244-
45. The Boros court distinguished malpractice from breach of contract. See id. It 
then held that to recover noneconomic damages for malpractice there need only 
be "affirmative wrongdoing," while to recover noneconomic damages for breach 
of contract the contract must be II predominantly personal in nature." Id. Thus, 
contrary to Defendants' characterization, Boros supports a holding that 
"affirmative wrongdoing" alone supports an award of noneconomic damages. 
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structured his firm in disregard of the state bar rules and that his non-attorney 
employee disregarded the client's explicit request to reject a settlement offer." (Id. Qj) 
(citing David C. Joel, 562 S.E.2d at 750).) They then assert that "there is no 
evidence of any comparably egregious conduct in this case." (Id.) But Craig 
Swapp structured his firm to give 108 injury litigation files to an attorney with 
little injury litigation experience (R. 8580-81, 8585-88, 8596, 8604, 9062-63), which 
arguably violates this state's bar rules. See Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.3 cmt. 2 (" A 
lawyer's work load must be controlled so that each matter can ·be handled 
competently."). Additionally, Highberg repeatedly deceived Ms. Kranendonk 
when she explicitly asked for information about her case and whether she should 
retain separate counsel. (R. 8644-45, 8648, 8655, 8660, 8664, 8666, 8797-98, 8918, 
8923-24, 8929, 8959, 9297-98; Trial Ex. 6 at DEF0033, DEF0035.) While the conduct 
in David C. Joel may have been different in the details, it was no more egregious 
than Defendants' willful misconduct here. 
Defendants also point to Schmidt v. Coogan, 335 P.3d 424 (Wash. 2014). (Br. 
of Appellants 29 n.3, 31.) However, the attorney's malpractice in that case 
amounted to negligence only; and, while the plaintiff "alleged that [her attorney] 
harassed, intimidated, and belittled her," there appears to have been no finding 
that such behavior actually occurred. Id. at 427,432 (emphasis added). In 
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contrast, Defendants' malpractice did not amount to simple negligence, and the 
jury found that the wrongful behavior actually occurred. 
C. The jury's finding that noneconomic damages resulted from 
Defendants' breaches of fiduciary duty is supported by 
sufficient evidence. 
Defendants contend that Ms. Kranendonk produced no evidence that she 
experienced emotional distress due to Defendants' willful misconduct. They are 
mistaken. This Court "will not overturn a verdict on a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence '[s]o long as some evidence and reasonable inferences 
support the jury's findings."' Breccf'r v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 2001 UT 77, 
,r 36, 31 P.3d 557 (citation omitted). At least "some evidence and reasonable 
inferences" support the jury's finding of noneconomic caused by Defendants' 
willful breaches of fiduciary duty. 
Highberg testified generally that attorney malpractice can be "emotionally 
catastrophic" for a client. (R. 8612-13.) Craig Swapp went further. He testified 
that attorney malpractice "should be" "very stressful" for a client and can 
"certainly" lead to "a lot of mental stress." (R. 9061-62.) He was not referring 
simply to attorney negligence; he was referring to failure to disclose" a conflict of 
interest" and" any of these breaches that we've talked about," including 
concealing important facts, deceiving the client, and putting firm interests ahead 
of client interests. (See R. 9041-62.) 
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Highberg followed his above testimony with testimony specifically about 
Ms. Kranendonk, saying that she was particularly susceptible to mental distress: 
A. [F]rom the very time that I first spoke to [Ms. Kranendonk], 
she was just what I would describe as a very anxious person 
and I don't know how else to put it other than that. She was 
intimidated by lawyers .... 
(R. 8650.) Accordingly, Highberg believed that Ms. Kranendonk would 
undoubtedly suffer emotional distress if she learned of his malpractice. For that 
reason, he did not tell her that he had missed the statute of limitations or about 
his efforts to save her case: 
Q. Well you certainly could have explained ... to Jodi[ that you had 
made arguments to the court regarding why her case should not 
be dismissed for missing the statute of limitations,] right? 
A. I could have. I just didn't think it helped her emotional well-
being, I guess. 
(R. 8797.) For that reason, he also did not tell her that he had hired outside 
counsel to try to save her case: 
Q. Did Ms. Kranendonk know [outside counsel] was now 
representing her? 
A. I don't think so. 
Q. Why didn't you talk to Ms. Kranendonk about that? 
A. 
(R. 8663-64.) 
... Again, I was absolutely trying to keep her from having to 
stress over these legal wranglings which she may or may not 
have understood to begin with. That was the point. 
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Just as Highberg anticipated would happen, Ms. Kranendonk experienced 
emotional distress when she learned that Defendants had lost her case, deceived 
her, concealed facts from her, and put their interests ahead of hers, as Mr. 
~ Kranendonk testified: 
(@ 
~ 
Q. From your perspective as you looked at Jod[i] when she got 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
the news that her case was dead, what [did that] do to her? 
She was devastated. 
What was it like that day on the phone? 
Oh, she was hysterical. I mean she was crying because not 
knowing where we were going to go from there .... 
(R. 8930-31.) Then Ms. Kranendonk testified to her own emotional distress: 
Q. How did you feel when you heard that your case was dead? 
A. I was devastated. I didn't know where I would go from there. 
(R. 8972.) She testified to her emotional distress a second time in response to a 
juror's question posed to her by the trial court: 
[Q.] Okay. Did you have any questions you felt were unanswered 
by Mr. Highberg when he made that call to you in May or 
June of 2009 about the case's dismissal. Were there any 
questions that you felt he didn't answer for you and, as a 
follow-up to that, if there were questions did you call the Salt 
Lake office of the Swapp firm to ask those questions that you 
felt were unanswered? So kind of two parts to that one. 
A. No. Once he told us that the ball had been dropped I was 
devastated. I didn't know any other questions to ask. I had 
never had that kind of a situation happen to me. 
(R. 9008.) 
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Craig Swapp conceded that Ms. Kranendonk experienced years of 
emotional distress because of Defendants' malpractice: 
Q. I mean there's been mounds of paper, court documents, 
pleadings that have been produced in this case since then, true? 
A. That's true. 
Q. Since the malpractice occurred, true? 
A. True. 
Q. And years of stress and worry for the Kranendonks, true? 
A. 
(R. 9087.) 
True. 
Defense counsel tried to get Ms. Kranendonk's expert to concede that the 
only damages in this case were those associated with Ms. Kranendonk's 
underlying injury claim, but the expert affirmed that this case also involved 
"emotional harm" due to "what happened between the lawyer and the client": 
Q. ... [W]e' re asking the Jury to evaluate the underlying accident 
and determine what if anything Ms. Kranendonk lost by the 
malpractice of Mr. Highberg, right? 
A. Well I assume that you're also evaluating the emotional harm ... 
Q. But at its core we're here to talk about the accident and what its 
resulting value was, right? 
A. I don't know if it's [at] its core, because to me it would involve a lot 
more than. that when you're dealing with what happened between the 
lawyer and the client, but I understand that's part of the case. 
(R. 9297-98 (emphasis added).) 
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In sum, there is evidence that a client's emotional distress is "certainly" 
expected, 11 should" occur, and may be "catastrophic" when an attorney commits 
malpractice; that emotional distress is expected after willful breaches of fiduciary 
duty; that Ms. Kranendonk was particularly susceptible to emotional distress; 
that Defendants were keenly aware of her fragility; that, not surprisingly, when 
she finally learned of Defendants' willful breaches of loyalty, she was 
"devastated"; that Mr. Kranendonk observed her devastation, along with the 
tears and hysteria it immediately induced; and that the Swapp Firm knew that 
Ms. Kranendonk suffered years of emotional distress. 
Defendants correctly observe that the Kranendonks' testimony was that 
Ms. Kranendonk became devastated "when she learned of [Defendants'] failure 
to file her case within the statute of limitations." (Br. of Appellants 32 (emphasis 
@ added).) They mistakenly assert, however, (1) that "there is no evidence to 
support Ms. Kranendonk's assertion that she was harmed by the intentional 
decisions by Mr. Highberg to wait ten months to tell Ms. Kranendonk of his 
malpractice," and (2) that Craig Swapp testified only tha_t Ms. Kranendonk's 
stress was a result of Defendants' "failure to file her case within the statute of 
limitations." (Id. at 32-33.) As noted above, Craig Swapp testified that emotional 
distress "should" result from failure to inform a client of a conflict of interest, 
from concealing important facts from a client, and from deceiving a client. (See R. 
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9041-62.) And Mr. Eisenberg testified that this case involved emotional distress 
because of "what happened between the lawyer and the client," not just because 
of what happened to the underlying case. (R. 9297-98.) 
Moreover, the Kranendonks never testified that Ms. Kranendonk's 
emotional devastation occurred because her underlying case was dead. Rather, 
they testified that, after having been told repeatedly that her case was proceeding 
normally, she was devastated "when she got the news" that she had been 
deceived. (R. 8930; see also R. 8972, 9008.) The Kranendonks referenced the timing 
of the devastation-"when she got the news," "when you learned," and "[o]nce 
he told us" - but did not identify the specific cause of that devastation. (R. 8930, 
8972, 9008.) Thus, the evidence is open to two reasonable inferences regarding 
the cause of her devastation: (1) that she was devastated because her injury case 
was dead, and/ or (2) that she was devastated because she had been deceived, 
mislead, and had her interests subordinated to those of her attorney. The Court is 
required to credit the inference that favors the jury's verdict. Hess v. Canberra 
Dev. Co., 2011 UT 22, ,I 28,254 P.3d 161. That inference is strengthened here by 
Highberg's testimony that Ms. Kranendonk was emotionally fragile and 
"intimidated by lawyers" - facts suggesting that her tears, hysteria, and 
devastation, which occurred when she learned she had been deceived, were 
caused, at least in part, by the fact that that attorney had misled her for months. 
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Even Craig Swapp' s concession that Ms. Kranendonk suffered years of 
stress and worry carries an inference that favors the jury's verdict. The Swapp 
Firm was Ms. Kranendonk' s counsel when she learned of its breaches of loyalty. 
~ It knew of her susceptibility to emotional distress, was on the phone with her 
when she learned of their deception, and knew that its breaches of loyalty 
"should" cause emotional distress. The reasonable inference from Craig Swapp' s 
concession that supports the verdict is that Ms. Kranendonk suffered emotional 
distress for years due to Defendants' willful breaches of fiduciary duty. 
Defendants have the burden to marshal the evidence and inferences that 
support the verdict and to show that the "marshaled evidence 'so clearly 
preponderates in favor of [them] that reasonable people would not differ on the 
outcome of the case."' Id. (citation omitted). They have not met that burden. 
D. Defendants waived review of their implicit objection to the 
jury instructions regarding noneconomic damages. 
Having failed to meet their marshaling burden, Defendants make what 
amounts to an objection to the jury instructions. They suggest, without citation to 
authority, that Ms. Kranendonk had the burden to prove that Defendants' 
@ breaches of fiduciary duty "caused her to experience more emotional distress 
than would have been occasioned by a simple loss of the case." (Br. of Appellants 
33.) Because there is evidence that Ms. Kranendonk experienced emotional 
distress due to Defendants' willful breaches of fiduciary duty, this argument 
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amounts to an assertion that the jury should have been instructed that (1) it could 
award noneconomic damages caused by Defendants' breaches of fiduciary duty, 
but (2) it could not award noneconomic damages caused by Defendants' 
negligent loss of Ms. Kranendonk's injury case. However, Defendants approved 
the jury final instructions without asking for such an instruction or objecting to 
its absence. (R. 6517-25, 9874-9922, 9930-63.) 
"Unless a party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an 
instruction, the instruction may not be assigned error except to avoid a manifest 
injustice." Utah R. Civ. P. 51(f). Moreover, "if counsel, either by statement or act, 
affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the jury 
instruction, [this Court] will not review the instruction under the manifest 
injustice exception." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ,I 54, 70 P.3d 111 (interpreting 
identical rule of criminal procedure); accord State v. Maese, 2010 UT App 106, 
,I,I 11-12, 236 P.3d 155. Thus, even if the jury should have been instructed that it 
could award noneconomic damages only for willful breaches of fiduciary duty 
and not for the negligent loss of Ms. Kranendonk' s injury claim, Defendants 
invited that error and waived the opportunity to raise it here by approving the 
final instructions without requesting one on that issue. 
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III. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES 
IN THE AMOUNT OF MS. KRANENDONK'S REASONABLE 
(JP CONTINGENCY FEE. 
A. Ms. Kranendonk is entitled to attorney fees for Defendants' 
breaches of fiduciary duty. 
In Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 2001 UT 89, 65 
P.3d 1134, rev'd on other grounds, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), this Court agreed "that 
~ breach of a fiduciary obligation is a well-established exception to the American 
rule precluding attorney fees in tort cases generally" and awarded fees against 
an insurer who breached its fiduciary duty to its insured. Id. ,r 122. Since then, 
the Court of Appeals has applied that holding to other fiduciary relationships. 
In Staffing America, Inc. v. Advanced Management Concepts, Inc., 2005 UT 
App 437U, 2005 WL 2600637 (mem.), the court's decision does not identify the 
type of relationship that gave rise to the defendant's fiduciary duty, but the 
Court of Appeals was "unpersuaded by [the defendant's] attempts to limit the 
fiduciary duty exception to the third-party insurance context" and concluded: 
Gib "Campbell broadly approved the awarding of attorney fees as damages for the 
breach of fiduciary duty and [the defendant] has not presented an adequate 
reason for us to limit that broad rule." Id. at para. 7. 
In Kealamakia, Inc. v. Kealamakia, 2009 UT App 148, 213 P.3d 13, the court 
affirmed an award of attorney fees where the defendant breached fiduciary 
duties arising from her role as a corporate officer. Id. ,r,r 2, 7. 
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In Holladay v. Storey, 2013 UT App 158,307 P.3d 584, the court held that 
failure to award fees for breach of fiduciary duty was reversible error where the 
defendant was a member and manager of a limited liability company and had 
fiduciary duties arising out of his role as manager and out of the company's 
operating agreement. Id. ,I,I 2, 48. 
Defendants do not suggest that Campbell, Staffing America, Kealamakia, or 
Holladay should be overturned. (See Br. of Appellants 42-49.) Instead, they argue 
that applying Campbell to cases where an attorney breaches his fiduciary duty 
would be" at odds with the facts of Campbell, Holladay, and Kealamakia, [and] with 
the underlying rational of the exception." (Id. at 43.) In other words, Defendants 
concede that insurance companies, corporate officers, limited liability company 
managers, and other fiduciaries should be required to pay attorney fees when 
they breach their fiduciary duties, but they argue that lawyers should not. 
Defendants' argument is undermined by Campbell itself. Prior to Campbell, 
this Court held that attorney fees are recoverable in the first-party insurance bad 
faith context because of an insurer's contractual duty of good faith. See Billings v. 
Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah 1996). In Campbell, the Court 
concluded that plaintiffs could recover "foreseeable attorney fees if they 
successfully pursue a third-party bad faith action against an insurer" in part 
because "[t]he duties ... arising in a third-party context include fiducianJ duties 
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and are higher than the duties arising under the contract theory in a first-party 
context." 2001 UT 89, ,r 121 ( emphasis added). 
" [ An attorney's] fiduciary duty is of the highest order," Smoot v. Lund, 369 
~ P.2d 933,936 (Utah 1962) (emphasis added). Thus, like the duties arising in the 
third-party insurance context, it is higher than the contractual duties arising in 
the first-party insurance context. Moreover, recognition of an attorney's fiduciary 
duty long predates recognition of an insurer's fiduciary duty. Compare Smoot, 369 
P.2d at 936, with Beck, 701 P.2d at 799. Accordingly, under the rationale that the 
availability of fees is based on the height of the duty owed, the Court must be 
prepared to overrule Billings and Campbell if it is unprepared to allow attorney 
fees for an attorney's breach of fiduciary duty. 
As further rationale for its holding in Campbell, the Court explained that 
the prospect of a fee award for an insurer's breach of fiduciary duty would 
"remove[] some of the incentive for an insurer to breach [its] duty"; "encourage[] 
insurers to act reasonably"; and "assist in fully compensating the insured" for the 
insurer's breach of duty. 2001 UT 89, ,r 121. Each of these reasons applies equally 
to an attorney's breach of fiduciary duty. Thus, failure to award attorney fees for 
an attorney's breach of fiduciary duty would, again, send the message that this 
Court is willing to hold insurers fully accountable for intentional misconduct but 
not willing to hold attorneys fully accountable for similar misconduct. 
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Defendants cite ten cases for the proposition that "most jurisdictions to 
consider the issue adhere to the American Rule even in the legal malpractice 
setting." (Br. of Appellants 47-48 n.11 (emphasis added).) However, in Utah 
"legal malpractice" is a generic and potentially misleading term because it can 
include claims for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract. 
Christensen v. Jensen, P.C. v. Barrett & Daines, 2008 UT 64, ,r 21, 194 P.3d 931. 
Of the ten cases Defendants cite for the proposition that most jurisdictions 
do not award attorney fees in the "legal malpractice setting," six involved 
malpractice constituting only attorney negligence, not breach of fiduciary duty, 
and are therefore inapposite. 95 In another, the plaintiff alleged negligence and 
other claims against two attorneys, but the appellate court upheld only the 
negligence claims; its refusal to award fees for attorney negligence is also 
inapposite here.96 Another case involved a fee dispute between attorneys and a 
client who alleged breach of contract and fraud but not breach of fiduciary 
duty.97 With no allegation of malpractice through breach of fiduciary duty, that 
95 See Horn v. Wooster, 165 P.3d 69, 75 (Wyo. 2007); John Kohl & Co. P.C. v. Dearborn 
& Ewing, 977 S.W.2d 528, 531 (Tenn. 1998); Began v. Dixon, 547 A.2d 620, 622 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 1988); Whitney v. Buttrick, 376 N.W.2d 274,276 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); 
Sorenson v. Fio Rita, 413 N.E.2d 47, 50-51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); McClain v. Faraone, 
369 A.2d 1090, 1092 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977). 
96 See Olson v. Fraase, 421 N.W.2d 820, 825-33 (N.D. 1988). 
97 Stinson v. Feminist Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 416 So.2d 1183, 1184-85 (Fla. Dist. 
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case is likewise inapposite here. The ninth case cited by Defendants involved no 
a ttomey malpractice of any kind. 98 
Of the ten cases Defendants cite for the proposition that most jurisdictions 
~ do not award attorney fees in the legal malpractice context, only Kelly v. Foster, 
813 P.2d 598 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991), addresses recovery of attorney fees for an 
attorney's breach of fiduciary duty. See id. at 600-01. In it, the Washington Court 
of Appeals affirmed that state's approach, which is to award attorney fees for 
breach of fiduciary duty only when the plaintiff seeks an equitable remedy (i.e., 
restoration of funds to a trust) but not when the plaintiff seeks a legal remedy 
(i.e., damages for herself). Id. Defendants cite five other Washington cases to 
confirm Washington's approach, but they offer no reason for Utah to adopt it. 
(Br. of Appellants 46-47.) In fact, if this Court adopted Washington's approach of 
<@ not awarding fees when the plaintiff seeks damages for herself, it would have to 
overrule Campbell since plaintiffs in the third-party insurance context seek 
damages for themselves, not for restoration of funds to a trust. 
Defendants also urge the Court to look to cases from Colorado since in 
Campbell the Court cited Bernhard v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 915 P.2d 1285 
Ct. App. 1982) (noting that the contract at issue had no attorney fee provision 
and holding that fraud is not a basis for a fee award under Florida law). 
98 See Simke, Chodos, Silberfeld & Anteau, Inc. v. Athans, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 95, 100-05 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (addressing whether fees are "damages" that must be pled 
specifically to be recovered under a default judgment). 
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(Colo. 1996). (Br. of Appellants 42-45.) The Court cited Bernhard in Campbell 
because the Campbell defendant relied on the Colorado Supreme Court's refusal 
in Bernhard to classify an insurer and insured's relationship in the third-party 
context as a fiduciary relationship and urged this Court to do the same. Campbell, 
2001 UT 89, ,r 122. This Court declined the invitation to call an insurer and 
insured's relationship in the third-party context something other than a fiduciary 
relationship but "accept[ed] [Bernhard's] assertion that breach of fiduciary 
obligation is a well-established exception to the American rule precluding 
attorney fees in tort cases generally." Id. 
In other words, this Court did not seek out Bernhard as a source of 
authority but, rather, cited it only in response to the defendant's argument and, 
incidentally, to note that even Bernhard acknowledged the rule on which the 
Campbell decision ultimately rested. Thus, Campbell's citation of Bernhard presents ~ 
no compelling reason for this Court to look to the evolution of Colorado law to 
guide the development of Utah's attorney fees jurisprudence. 
If the Court nevertheless looks to Colorado law, the more recent opinion in 
Smith v. MehaffiJ, 30 P.3d 727 (Colo. App. 2000), is most persuasive. There, the 
Colorado Court of Appeals relied on Utah law to distinguish between an 
attorney's negligence and an attorney's breach of fiduciary duty and indicated 
that in Colorado attorney fees are recoverable for attorneys' breaches of fiduciary 
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duty but not for attorney negligence. Id. at 733-34 (citing Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein 
& Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah App.1996)). Where that Colorado holding is the 
most recent one cited by Defendants and relies on Utah law, it is the best case to 
~ look to if the Court seeks guidance from Colorado. 
Most telling is Defendants' acknowledgement that multiple jurisdictions 
allow recovery of attorney fees for a fiduciary's "inexcusable misconduct" (see Br. 
of Appellants 46)99 and their simultaneous failure to acknowledge that by 
deceiving Ms. Kranendonk, concealing important facts from her, putting their 
interests ahead of hers, and/ or choosing not to inform her of an existing conflict, 
they engaged in inexcusable misconduct. Defendants' refusal to recognize the 
egregiousness of their misconduct is the best evidence of the need to award fees 
in cases such as this to deter similarly inexcusable conduct in the future. 
B. This Court's opinion in USA Power does not require a 
lodestar analysis in this case. 
Defendants argue that, even if an award of fees is proper for an attorney's 
breach of fiduciary duty, the Court should reverse the fee award here because 
99 Defendants cite In re Trusteeship of Trust of Williams, 631 N.W.2d 398,410 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2001) (allowing fees for fiduciary's "inexcusable misconduct"); William 
Trust Co. v. Coulter, 208 A.2d 677,682 (Del. Ch. 1965) (allowing fees for 
fiduciary's conduct of an "inexcusable nature"); Parker v. Rogerson, 370 N.Y.S.2d 
753, 755 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (allowing fees for fiduciary "wrongdoing"); Allard 
v. Pac. Nat'l Bank, 663 P.2d 104, 112 (Wash. 1983) (allowing fees for fiduciary's 
"inexcusable conduct"); and Wolff v. Calla, 288 F. Supp. 891,894 (E.D. Pa. 1968) 
(allowing fees for fiduciary's "unjustified" behavior). 
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Ms. Kranendonk did not timely submit lodestar evidence. (Br. of Appellants 50-
56.) Defendants contend that this Court's recent decision in USA Power, LLC v. 
PacifiCorp, 2016 UT 20, 372 P.3d 629, requires a lodestar analysis in every case 
except where fees are sought as consequential damages for breach of an 
insurance contract. (Id. at 50-51.) Defendants are mistaken. 
In USA Power, the plaintiff was entitled to an award of fees and presented 
evidence for a lodestar analysis, which presumably included the hours its 
attorneys worked and the attorneys' billing rates. Id. ,r 91. The plaintiff also 
presented its contingency fee agreement but apparently no evidence of whether 
that fee agreement was reasonable. See id. Thus, the trial court had two options: 
(1) conduct a lodestar analysis, or (2) grant attorney fees "based entirely on [the] 
contingency fee arrangement." See id. Given those options, the trial court chose to 
base its fee award on a lodestar analysis. Id. The plaintiff appealed and argued 
"for an award based entirely on its contingency fee arrangement," id. (emphasis 
added), i.e., an award based on a contingency fee agreement that had not been 
evaluated for reasonableness, see id. ,r,r 91-96. 
On appeal, this Court first addressed the two options that had been before 
the trial court. See id. ,r,r 92-94. As to the first, the Court held that "the trial court 
did not err in employing the traditional lodestar method." Id. ,r 92. As to the 
second, it said that "purely contingency fee-based awards" are permissible only 
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~ 
when such fees are "foreseeable consequential damages stemming from a breach 
of an insurance contract." Id. ,r,r 93-94. 
The Court then addressed a third option, one not presented by the facts of 
USA Power. See id. ,r 95. That was to "not' simply use[] the contingency fee 
arrangement without evaluating the reasonableness for that amount"' but to 
instead make an evidence-based evaluation of the reasonableness of the 
contingency fee itself "under the traditional reasonableness analysis." See id. 
(citation omitted). The Court noted that this third approach was followed by the 
Court of Appeals in Kealamakia, Inc. v. Kealamakia, 2009 UT App 148, 213 P.3d 13. 
USA Power, 2016 UT 20, ,r 95. The Court then expressly affirmed that Kealamakia 
does not conflict with USA Power. Id. 
Thus, USA Power contemplates that when there is a contingency fee 
agreement in a case not involving the breach of an insurance contract, a court has 
two options for determining the amount of fees to award a prevailing plaintiff: 
(1) conduct a lodestar analysis and apply a multiplier based on the contingent 
nature of the case, or (2) conduct an evidence-based analysis of whether the 
contingency fee is reasonable. See id. ,r,r 95-96. In Kealamakia, the second 
approach was used because the trial court had evidence of the contingency fee's 
reasonableness and no lodestar evidence. See 2009 UT App 148, ,r,r 9-10. In USA 
Power, the opposite was true- the trial court had lodestar evidence but no 
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evidence of the contingency fee's reasonableness. See 2016 UT 20, 1191-92. 
Again, while the Court focused in USA Power on the first approach, it expressly 
endorsed the Kealamakia approach as well. See id. 1192, 95-96. 
Here, the trial court used the Kealamakia approach and found that Ms. 
Kranendonk' s fee agreement was reasonable (R. 7698-99), and Defendants do not 
challenge that finding (see Br. of Appellants 50-56). Because USA Power endorsed 
the Kealamakia approach, and because the trial court followed that approach to 
make an undisputed finding that Ms. Kranendonk's contingency fee is 
reasonable, the Court should affirm the trial court's attorney fee award. 
C. If USA Power does newly require a lodestar analysis here, the 
Court should remand for consideration of evidence relevant to 
that new law, or it should find that the award of fees was 
reasonable in light of the lodestar evidence already submitted. 
Even if USA Power does require a lodestar analysis before an award of fees 
in a contingency fee case like this, USA Power was not the law when the trial 
court awarded fees here. Thus, while Ms. Kranendonk had opportunities to 
submit lodestar evidence before the trial court ruled on her motion for fees, she 
was not required to submit that evidence under the law then in effect. Nor was 
she required to anticipate that the law would change. Cf, e.g., Karnahrens v. Evatt, 
66 F.3d 1350, 1360 (4th Cir. 1995) ("[A]n attorney's assistance is not rendered 
ineffective because he failed to anticipate a new rule of law."). 
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"When [this Court] clarify[ies] the law or adopts legal principles, [it] may 
remand for further proceedings so that the parties may develop the record in 
light of the newly articulated rule." Park v. Stanford, 2011 UT 41, ,r 33, 258 P.3d 
566. "Development of the record is particularly warranted where lower courts 
have applied a different rule of law to the facts and the parties have not had an 
opportunity to develop the record with an eye toward the newly articulated 
rule." Id. The trial court admittedly afforded Ms. Kranendonk opportunities to 
submit lodestar evidence, but it gave her those opportunities at a time when that 
evidence was not required. If this Court concludes that USA Power newly 
requires a lodestar analysis in calculating reasonable attorney fees in a case like 
this, justice requires that the Court allow Ms. Kranendonk to develop the record 
with an eye toward that new rule. See id. Accordingly, the Court should remand 
(.I for consideration of Ms. Kranendonk' s lodestar evidence. 
Alternatively, Ms. Kranendonk already submitted lodestar evidence in 
@ response to the trial court's post-judgment Minute Entry. (R. 7780-7821.) She also 
submitted briefing demonstrating that a reasonable fee based on that lodestar 
evidence would be in excess of $2,000,000 (R. 7768-70), which confirms that the 
trial court's award of Ms. Kranendonk' s $1,666,667 contingency fee was 
reasonable. Thus, rather than remand, the Court could affirm the trial court's fee 
award based on the lodestar evidence and briefing already submitted below. See 
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Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618,622 (Utah 1989) ("[A] 
remand is not necessary if the evidence in the record is undisputed and the 
appellate court can fairly and properly resolve the case on the record before it."). 
IV. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO 
AWARD MS. KRANENDONK HER LITIGATION EXPENSES. 
A. Litigation expenses are recoverable for an attorney's breach 
of fiduciary duty where the attorney's conduct in litigation 
is largely responsible for the expenses. 
After holding in Campbell that breach of fiduciary duty is a basis for an 
award of fees, this Court explained: "[The defendant] argues that, like attorney 
fees, litigation expenses may not be awarded as damages in a tort action. For the 
same reasons detailed in the previous section regarding atto1ney fees, we 
conclude that litigation expenses are recoverable in this limited type of action[.]" 
2001 UT 89, ,r 127. The Court then concluded: "[O]ur determination [is] that 
litigation expenses may be awarded in [insurer breach of fiduciary duty cases] in 
which the defendant's litigation conduct has been largely responsible for them." 
Id. Likewise here, for the same reasons detailed above regarding attorney fees, 
the Court should conclude that litigation expenses are recoverable for an 
attorney's willful breach of fiduciary duty where the attorney's litigation conduct 
is largely responsible for those expenses. 
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B. Defendants' litigation conduct is largely responsible for Ms. 
Kranendonk's expenses. 
This case required Ms. Kranendonk to prove both her underlying injury 
claim against the truckers and her legal malpractice claim against Defendants. 
Defendants' litigation conduct was largely responsible for the expenses Ms. 
Kranendonk incurred in proving these claims. 
Defendants filed two complaints in Oregon and one in Washington 
wherein they alleged that the truckers were liable for the crash giving rise to Ms. 
Kranendonk's injury claim. (Trial Ex. Nos. 2, 3, & 13.) Later, Ms. Kranendonk's 
current counsel filed a complaint against the truckers in Oregon in an attempt to 
save the case under the Oregon savings statute. (R. 1-17, 3302.) In their answers 
to that complaint, the truckers admitted that they were solely responsible for the 
crash. (Trial Ex. 62.) Notwithstanding the truckers' admissions, Defendants' 
repeated representations to courts in Washington and Oregon, and the fact that 
all other evidence pointed to the truckers being the sole cause of the crash, in this 
litigation Defendants never conceded the truckers' liability and, instead, forced 
Ms. Kranendonk to engage in over six years of litigation on that issue, including 
an appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals regarding the truckers' liability. See 
Kranendonk v. Gregory & Swapp, PLLC, 2014 UT App 36, 320 P.3d 689; (R. 6573). 
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Additionally, when Defendants represented Ms. Kranendonk, they told 
the Oregon and Washington courts, and others, that Ms. Kranendonk was 
injured in the crash. (Trial Ex. 2, 3, 13, & 34.) They said she had "sustained 
massive injuries" (Trial Ex. 34), including "to her neck, back, and knees, resulting 
in multiple surgeries on her left knee" (Trial Ex. 2 & 3), and they calculated her 
damages at that time to be at least $623,098.65 (Trial Ex. 3). Yet in this litigation, 
Defendants never conceded that the crash caused injury to Ms. Kranendonk and 
instead forced her to litigate causation and damages for over six years. (See R. 
6573.) In the process, they retained multiple experts to contest the notion that she 
was injured in the crash (R. 9718, 9808-21 ), which required Ms. Kranendonk to 
obtain expert testimony to prove that she had been injured (R. 9173-9210). 
As to malpractice, Defendants admitted early on their negligent failure to 
serve the truckers before the statute of limitations ran. However, they waited 
until they were on the witness stand at trial to admit that they had breached their 
contract with her (R. 9089), and they never admitted that they breached their 
fiduciary duties (see R. 6574). Defendants' litigation strategy of refusing to 
acknowledge until trial the wrongfulness of their conduct inflated Ms. 
Kranendonk's litigation expenses, including by forcing her to retain an expert on 
attorney ethics. (See R. 9244-45.) 
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In short, Defendants' litigation strategy was to admit next to nothing, not 
even the obvious, and thereby extend this litigation for years, requiring Ms. 
Kranendonk to incur a multitude of expenses that could have been substantially 
~ limited had the case been narrowed to the few genuinely disputable issues. The 
Court should therefore conclude that Defendants' litigation conduct is largely 
responsible for Ms. Kranendonk's litigation expenses and remand for a 
determination of which of those expenses were reasonable and necessary. See 
Campbell, 2001 UT 89, ,r 128. 
V. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE THAT HIGHBERG CALLED MS. 
KRANENDONK A "MORON" AND A "PAIN IN THE ASS." 
Ms. Kranendonk requested punitive damages and, thus, had to prove that 
Defendants' deception, concealment of important facts, and/ or failure to tell her 
of their conflict of interest "manifested a knowing and reckless indifference 
toward, and a disregard of, [her] rights." (R. 6575.) 
When he was her attorney, Highberg called Ms. Kranendonk "a pain [in] 
the ass" and "a moron" (Trial Ex. 6 at DEF0033), and the district court concluded 
prior to trial that those statements were relevant to punitive damages because of 
"the indifference and disregard" they showed toward Ms. Kranendonk' s rights. 
(R. 8229, 5389.) The court decided, however, that "the relevance of [the 
statements was] outweighed, at least at [that] point in time, by [their] prejudicial 
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value." (R. 8229-30, 5389) But the court said "that this is one issue that may be 
readdressed as the evidence is developed." (R. 5389.) 
During trial, Highberg testified three times that he acted as he did because 
he wanted to protect Ms. Kranendonk and take care of her: 
A. . .. I'm trying to protect her. I'm trying to make her feel better 
.... That's the only reason. For another client perhaps I would 
have done something different, but not this client. 
(R. 8629-30.) 
A. . .. It would burden her and so in all honestly maybe it seems 
strange to say it, but I was trying to protect her .... 
(R. 8649-50.) 
A. ... Again, I was absolutely trying to keep her from having to 
stress over these legal wranglings which she may or may not 
have understood to begin with. That was the point. 
Q. You just wanted to take care of the client. 
A. I did. 
(R. 8663-64.) The plain implication of Highberg's testimony is that he was 
motivated solely by a personal solicitude that he felt for Ms. Kranendonk. 
After Highberg's foregoing testimony, Ms. Kranendonk asked to introduce 
the evidence that he actually thought she was "a pain in the ass" and "a moron." 
(R. 8778-88.) But the trial court (with a new judge who had not previously ruled 
on the admissibility of this evidence) concluded that Highberg had not "opened 
the door when he said [he] care[d] about her." (R. 8788.) Instead, the court 
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reasoned: "[I]t just appears that he was making a note to himself to suggest that 
there were times she was a little irritating and he was getting a little impatient in 
some ways." (Id.) In other words, the trial court drew an inference and, based 
~ thereon, determined that the comments were not relevant. It did not engage in a 
rule 403 analysis, which requires a determination of whether the evidence's 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of it causing unfair 
prejudice. Utah R. Evid. 403. 
The trial court's earlier ruling that High berg's "pain in the ass" and 
"moron" comments were relevant to Ms. Kranendonk's punitive damages claim 
was correct since those comments do tend to show indifference and disregard 
toward her and her rights. The trial court's later failure to conduct a rule 403 
analysis when Highberg opened the door to his motivations was error. See State 
@ v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ,r 21,973 P.2d 404 ("[R]ule 403 allows for exclusion of 
evidence based on policy analysis, not relevancy. Thus the failure of the court to 
make the proper analysis under rule 403 would constitute error."). 
Even under a rule 403 analysis, exclusion of Highberg's comments was an 
abuse of discretion. When conducting a rule 403 analysis '"[t]he availability of 
other means of proof may ... be an appropriate factor"' in determining 
admissibility, id. (citation omitted), and "a defendant can 'open the door' to the 
admission of evidence that could otherwise be considered ... unfairly 
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prejudicial," State v. Ruiz, 2014 UT App 143, ~ 40, 329 P.3d 836. The Ruiz case is 
an example of these two principles in practice. 
In Ruiz, an infant died in the defendant's care, and "an autopsy revealed 
that the infant's internal injuries were consistent with shaken-baby syndrome." 
Id. ~~ 1, 3. The Department of Child and Family Services (DCFS) made a 
supported finding of child abuse but "ultimately dismissed its case." Id. 
However, "[t]he State charged [the defendant] with depraved indifference 
murder and reckless child abuse homicide[.]" Id. 
At trial, the defendant testified: "DCFS investigators 'probably did a better 
investigation ... than [the] Provo Police and they closed their case."' Id. ~ 10. In 
rebuttal, the State called the DCFS case manager. Id.~ 11. "After clarifying that 
DCFS findings are not based on the same standard of proof employed in criminal 
proceedings, [the DCFS manager] testified that the findings in [the Ruiz] case 
'supported physical abuse ... due to an infant dying in her care[.]"' Id. 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion 
by allowing the DCFS manager to testify about the finding of substantiated 
abuse. Id. ~ 39. The Court of Appeals disagreed, saying:" [A parh;] 'cannot 
introduce potentially inflammaton; evidence and then later complain when the opposing 
parhJ attempts to rebut it."' Id. ~ 40 (citation omitted). It noted that the defendant's 
"testimony about the DCFS investigation implied that DCFS had found her 
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innocent of any wrongdoing," and it then observed that" only [the case 
1nanager' s testimony] effectively rebutted [the defendant's] hnplication that, 
having cornpleted a more thorough investigation than the police, DCFS 
ultimately concluded she was innocent." Id. ilil 1, 42. Thus, "the case manager's 
testimony was essential to rebut [the defendant's] assertion that DCFS had 
essentially exonerated her after a thorough investigation, so its probative value 
was very high in relation to the potential for unfair prejudice." Id. ,I 44. 
Ruiz strongly suggests that, not only was it not an abuse of discretion to 
admit the rebuttal evidence there, but that it would have been an abuse of 
discretion to exclude it because the defendant opened the door by introducing 
potentially inflammatory statements and the case manager's testimony was the 
only effective evidence to rebut the inference to be drawn from the defendant's 
self-serving testimony. See id. ilil 42-45. 
Just as the Ruiz defendant opened the door with testimony implying that 
DCFS had exonerated her, Highberg opened the door with testimony implying 
that he was motivated solely by a personal solicitude that he felt for Ms. 
Kranendonk. Additionally, just as the case manager's testimony was highly 
probative since it was the only evidence that could effectively rebut the 
ilnplication to be drawn from the defendant's testhnony about the DCFS 
investigation, Highberg's derogatory comments are highly probative since they 
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are the only evidence that can effectively rebut the implication to be drawn fr01n 
his testimony about what motivated him to breach his fiduciary duties. The Ruiz 
opinion suggested that it would have been an abuse of discretion to exclude the 
essential rebuttal evidence there, and this Court should conclude that it was an 
abuse of discretion to exclude the essential rebuttal evidence here. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should (1) affirm the award of noneconomic da1nages under 
Ms. Kranendonk' s breach of contract claim and/ or her breach of fiduciary duty 
claim; (2) affirm the award of attorney fees in the amount of Ms. Kranendonk' s 
reasonable contingency fee; (3) reverse the failure to award Ms. Kranendonk all 
of her reasonable and necessary expenses and re1nand for a determination of 
those expenses; and (4) reverse the exclusion of Highberg's "moron" and "pain 
in the ass" comments and remand for retrial of the punitive damages claim. 
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ADDENDUM 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISION 
Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 403 
Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, 
Confusion, Waste of Time, or Other Reasons 
@ The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. 
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